

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ADP-00 AID-20 EB-11 NSC-10 RSC-01

CIEP-02 SAL-01 SS-14 STR-08 OMB-01 CEA-02 L-03 H-02

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 PA-03 USIA-12 PRS-01

COME-00 FRB-02 TRSE-00 XMB-07 OPIC-12 LAB-06 SIL-01

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 043578

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, EEC, VN, VS

SUBJ: GERMAN AMBASSADOR' S FAREWELL CALL ON THE SECRETARY

1. FRG AMBASSADOR PAULS PAID A FAREWELL CALL ON THE
SECRETARY MARCH 7 AND IN ADDITION TO EXPRESSING APPRECI-
ATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION HE HAD RECEIVED
FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT DURING HIS YEARS IN WASHINGTON
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NOTED HOW HEAVILY HIS LAST DAYS HERE HAD BEEN BURDENED BY THE TRAGEDY IN KHARTOUM. HE EXPRESSED HIS DEEP SYMPATHY FOR THE LOSS SUFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH GERMAN DIPLOMATS SHARED WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE. THE SECRETARY COMPLIMENTED PAULS ON THE ABLE WAY IN WHICH HE HAD FULFILLED HIS DUTIES AS GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND WISHED HIM WELL IN HIS NEW POST. SUBSTANTIVELY THE CONVERSATION FOCUSSED ON TWO TOPICS, US/ EC RELATIONS AND INDOCHINA.

2. US/ EC RELATIONS -- PAULS RECALLED THAT AS EARLY AS 1969 HE HAD FORESEEN A DEVELOPING CRISIS IN US/ EC RELATIONS. WHEN CHANCELLOR BRANDT VISITED WASHINGTON IN 1970 PAULS HAD TOLD HIM THAT BILATERAL US/ FRG RELATIONS WERE NOT LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM. DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE CONCENTRATED BETWEEN THE US AND THE COMMUNITY. THE CHANCELLOR DURING THAT VISIT HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN URGING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INSTITUTIONALIZED, HIGH LEVEL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN WASHINGTON

AND BRUSSELS. NOW WE FACE SERIOUS MONETARY ISSUES AND IMPENDING TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO DEAL WITH THEM IN A PRAGMATIC WAY WITHOUT MUTUAL BLAME. PAULS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A GOOD PART OF THE PROBLEM LIES WITH THE EC WHICH HAS NEVER DEVELOPED A CLEARLY DEFINED POLICY TOWARD THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE US. PAULS FEARED THAT UNLESS THESE PROBLEMS WERE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED THE COHESION OF NATO COULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED, SOMETHING WHICH COULD GIVE SATISFACTION ONLY TO THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

3. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE OTHER SIDE MUST BE ENJOYING OUR PRESENT DISCOMFITURE. HE THOUGHT ONE MUST REALISTICALLY RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEMS BUT AT THE SAME TIME VIEW THEM SOMEWHAT PHILOSOPHICALLY. INEVITABLY IN A FREE SOCIETY POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE TO MAKE STATEMENTS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO MEET INTERNAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE IN ORDER TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF TRADE LEGISLATION ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN WILL PROBABLY MAKE STATEMENTS WHICH SOME EUROPEANS WILL NOT LIKE. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, FOR EUROPEANS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT LIES BEHIND SUCH
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STATEMENTS; OTHERWISE THE KIND OF MUTUAL BLAMING TO

WHICH AMBASSADOR PAULS HAD REFERRED WOULD RESULT.

4. AMBASSADOR PAULS SAID THAT HE HAD SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THIS VERY POINT TO BONN. HE HAD INFORMED HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE PROTECTIONIST MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE US APPROACH TO TRADE LEGISLATION WERE AIMED AT GETTING LEGISLATION THROUGH CONGRESS AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH CLEARLY REMAINED IN THE DIRECTION OF FREER TRADE. HE THOUGHT THOUGH THAT PEOPLE WERE INCLINED TO LET EMOTIONS RUN AWAY WITH THEM AND PAID TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE FACTS AND FIGURES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT WAS LIKE PEOPLE WHO WERE FOLLOWING A TRIAL. GENERALLY THEY WANTED TO HEAR THE SUMMATION BUT NOT THE DETAILED EVIDENCE. AS AMBASSADOR PAULS HAD SUGGESTED, IN THE TRADE AND MONETARY PROBLEMS IT WAS THE DETAILED EVIDENCE, I. E., THE FACTS AND FIGURES WHICH WERE IMPORTANT.

5. INDOCHINA -- IN RESPONSE TO PAULS' QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA FOLLOWING THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE, IN HIS OPINION, HAVE DECIDED THAT THE WAR SHOULD END. BOTH ARE TRYING TO GET ALONG WITH THE US. THIS WAS EVIDENT IN PARIS IN THE SEPARATE BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WHICH HE HAD HAD WITH HIS CHINESE AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES BOTH OF WHOM HAD FOUND IT IN THEIR INTEREST

TO PUBLICIZE THE MEETINGS EXTENSIVELY. THE CHINESE AND SOVIETS ON THE OTHER HAND DID NOT HAVE BILATERAL MEETINGS AND HARDLY SPOKE TO EACH OTHER DURING THE CONFERENCE. THERE WAS AN EVIDENT PHYSICAL TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS. PAULS ASKED WHETHER THE CHINESE WOULD PREFER FOUR CONTINUING CENTERS OF POWER IN INDOCHINA IN HANOI, SAIGON, VIENTIANE AND PHNOM PENH OR THE GRADUAL CONSOLIDATION OF INDOCHINA UNDER HANOI'S CONTROL. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE PRINCIPAL CHINESE INTEREST WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT GAIN INFLUENCE AND CONTROL IN INDOCHINA. THEY SEEM TO CALCULATE THAT US INFLUENCE WOULD HELP TO PREVENT THIS. THIS REASONING WAS REFLECTED IN THEIR CLEAR ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTINUING US PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THE SECOND CHINESE OBJECTIVE
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WAS TO AFFORD SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE TO HANOI AND TO THE PATHET LAO TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE ABANDONING FELLOW COMMUNISTS. THIS WAS IMPORTANT TO THE CHINESE BECAUSE OF THEIR AMBITIONS TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND IN THE

THIRD WORLD. ROGERS

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